Proposal 9: Update to Vesting, Liquidity Mining & PowerIndex Design

Wow. That’s nice proposal.
Thank you that you describe the process behind this prop.
About value between PowerIndex and CVP - brilliant point.

I have several questions:

  1. In this statement do you mean linear vesting or full lock until 10 weeks pass?

I think linear vesting is more reasonable because we can blur sell pressure out.

  1. Don’t understand few points in “CVP circ” bar. At prop 6 was defined that we have: DAO Grants (7m CVP), Community Pool (4.5m CVP), First Governance Vote (3m CVP), Liquidity Mining Rewards (2m CVP a month for 12 months).

We can skip DAO grants because of 3 years lock, but where is Community Pool (additional rewards for PIPT pools) and First Governance Vote?
I agree that we don’t have CVP-stake function yet, but maybe you have some thoughts.

  1. What do you think about Community Pool?
    Defenition in prop 6:

Community Pool (4.5m CVP) – These will continue to stay the same until the PowerIndex is launched. Then the remaining CVP rewards will be redirected to incentivize a Uniswap pool for USDC/ PowerIndex LP shares (“PIPT”).

There is no clear meaning for what a community pool is. I have 2 guesses: it’s brand-new treasury for incentivizing people or whole farming bank which is active now in mining CVP.
Anyway, we have some CVPs (in best-case scenario 4.5m) to add in PIPT pools.

I will be happy to propose my thoughts about distribution if somebody provides a clear definition for the community pool and how much CVP do we have in it. @powerpoolAdmin @DrGonzo

To sum up, it’s great and detailed proposal with nice explanations and motivation behind it. Love to read and educate myself through it.

It will be pleasure to make it better in community discussion.

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I am for! Great work here librachad.


Hey! Hice comments!

Dont worry about 4.5 mn CVP community pool - this is just a name for a part of the tokens which are in the community hands

This concept was pretty much messy explained previously - we had a discussion on it.
In essence this was a residual CVPs when you extract all the CVPs allocated to diff programs, grant etc from total supply

We had ~77mn CVPs which should left for the community to decide what to do with them in october:

TTS -alpha/beta/gamma - organic LPs (community Pool?) - DAO grant = 77 000 000

100 000 000 - 15 000 000 - 478 000 - 7 000 000 = ~77 000 000

so 24 000 000 LM rewards
and 3 000 000 govn rewards
and 4 500 000 community pool

were sitting inside that 77 000 000

This is it. I am happy we exclude this concept from the discussion of tokenomics

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Thank you for your answer.

I think, current tokenimics needs one more guide through. Articles from medium feels old.

Happy to help. Luckly I spent time to deep dive in what we used to have and there is no time cost for me to refresh it.

The thing which really annoying imo is that while we are voting for/against the PI, the main convo here is the change of the tokenomics, not the index discussion. And as I see the token distribution schedule (both - old and new) is something the most part of the community (even the active ones) are not familiar with

Let me comment on the key parts of the proposal separately

why the token distribution schedule proposed by @YanDelphi is an elegant solution and better than the previous token distribution schedule

Lets compare what did we have and what is proposed - token distribution schedule / testers voting power dilution (see the charts below)

  1. proposal 6
  2. proposal 9
  3. proposal 9 with adjustment for the ETH/CVP LM rewards (assuming that after Jan-2021 we keep the rewards at 1/2 level of 91k per week proposed in Proposal 9)

a. CIRC SUPPLY: a way better distribution schedule - by YE2022 the circ supply is 30-40% less!..
Proposal 6: 8% - 17% - 43% / 1H2021 - YE2021 - YE2022 respectively
Proposal 9 / 9 (ADJ): 10-11% - 15-18% - 26-30% / 1H2021 - YE2021 - YE2022 respectively

b. Testers voting power dillution: while the testers voting power is even more diluted!
Proposal 6: 63% of votes belong to the testers by YE2021
Proposal 9 / 9 (ADJ): 52-58% of votes belong to the testers by YE2021

Conclusion: Great proposal overall! Please see a couple of adjustment from my side below


  1. In case we change the tokenomics anyway lets add the idle tokens burn as @CryptoSignalz suggested in Proposal 8 Proposal 8: Reduce diluted valuation by burning part of the community treasury.
    I would suggest burning of 25% of TTS and then decide whether we need to burn more tokens, while consider using the remaining locked “idle” 25 mn CVP as a protection from a hostile take over (please see here CEXes, government and interests
    the discussion initiated by @Zero)

  2. Happy we got back to keeping the CVP/ETH pool - I have been arguing to keep it all the time.
    You guys say its important to have the liquidity there and still assume that the rewards will be excluded since Jan-2021 - so what will happen with the CVP/ETH liquidity (please see the current example of UNI)

Lets just consider in the base case model that the rewards will be halved since Feb-2021 (40.5k CVP per week) - this is more realistic

I’m for merging proposal 8 with proposal 9 and burn 25% of TTS.

If we plan to burn a portion of the TTS in the near future it is better to include it in the current tokenomics change rather than frequent changes which broadcast uncertainty.

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BTW, How about putting it in the following way:
Include a statement that by the mid of December-2020 we will either burn or lock up for at least 3 years up to 50% of TTS

  1. Simplify the things
  2. Give ourselves more time for discussion
  3. Give a strong signal to the market

Now to the next part

Power Index
Wanted to provide a supporting analysis from my side - “why these projects?”, hope it will help the community to vote

  1. As DeFi meta-governance ETF, PI has exposure to all the key segments of DeFi, while the initial PI composition is skewed towards the basic and most resilient layer - Lending protocols (MKR, AAVE, COMP)

  2. At the same time there are some restrictions for PI composites selection:
    a. Significant MCap and ADTV as PI’s composites shares need to be easily adjusted (I roughly estimate this level at ~$200 mn for both Mcap and ~$20 mn ADTV)
    b. FDV/Mcap ratio <= 5x to limit the value dilution risk, while keeping recently listed projects with a large number of tokens yet to be unlocked (namely - UNI)
    c. Decentralized governance function (GT). This is the reason why such projects as REN, Augur (and Chainlink) are not included

  3. Some other great projects such as BAL and CRV are not included because of the FDV/MCap (+ specific lock up terms for CRV) and also the fact that PI has exposure on DEXes via UNI

  4. Similar reason is why WNXM is included instead of LRC, KNC and Sushi – WNXM is the only way to get exposure on a very promising insurance market, while DEXes are already represented by UNI
    Also, FDV and MCAp to TVL ratio is much higher than PI components’ average for LRC and KNC (9-18x vs 0.5-1.5x)

So the only project with relatively weaker metrics included into PI is wNXM.
But, I believe, we need take several facts into account:

  1. Insurance segment metrics can not be directly compared with Lending protocols, DEXes, and Asset managers
  2. Insurance segment is much more underdeveloped at the moment (which actually creates the growth potential)
  3. Just as with analogy “classic ETF market / crypto ETF market”, the classic insurance market is huge and represented by long institutional money mostly. NXM is obviously the segment leader and best exposed to take the advantage of the insurance market whatever direction the market is developing

Thanks for a so visual comparison @Sergey, can you please clarify on what do you mean by “Idle token”?

50 mn CVPs that will be locked at least for the next 3yrs - burn half of them and use another half as a veto voting mechnism in emergency case

Centralisation? Yes
Elegant? yes:)

To be honest, I don’t truly understand what all you say but great to see an active proposal here.

aahhaha why?

this explains pretty simply why the proposed tokenomics is beter

And this gives more details on the selection of PI composites

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Great, thank you so much :blush:

Hey everyone, added two modifications to the proposal that I believe will definitely improve it.


read the proposal. I like this improvement - it will massively boost APY and TVL, and will help to compete with PieDAO/DPI. Balancer 80/20 is also a good option for PIPT


There’s something really major I think someone needs to clearly state/confirm: Am I correct to think that the liquidity mining reward of 400k/mth is only referring to the provision of liqudity for CVP/ETH in Uniswap/Balancer (yellow bit in the graph in the proposal). There is a seperate liqudity incentive (white bit in the graph in the proposal) for PIPT suppliers (either directly staking PIPT via the powerPool app or via a (currently non-existing) PIPT/ETH Uniswap pool)…Am I getting the proposal right here? If so, how much is the reward for PIPT suppliers?

What is ‘Organic LPs (community pool?)’?
What is DAO grant?
Do current incentives for liquidity provision of CVP/ETH on Uniswap come from ‘Organic LPs (community pool?)’? Do they come from the 77m in the Treasury?

you also say:
“so 24 000 000 LM rewards
and 3 000 000 govn rewards
and 4 500 000 community pool
were sitting inside that 77 000 000”
Where can I see the breakdown of how the 77m is earmarked? You covered 31.5 of 77m…

why rush the burning/locking up by Dec 20? Why not let the project grow for a few months and then vote again on burning/locking up?

FOR both the adjustments