The PowerPool team is planning to give vested CVP, held by testers, voting rights. If this change is implemented then the power of whales, who got free tokens, will increase ten fold. Why? Beta and Gamma control 10,000,000 CVP which is 2X the current circulating supply. In addition, the average holder, excluding outliers- testers, have about 2,000 CVP. Therefore, the popular opinion must garner 25 community members for each tester vote. Currently, a tester’s voting power is 25X a normal holder. We all know that governance participation is low across all DeFi protocols. If this is implemented then it will cement whales’ undisputed leverage over the protocol. Let us remind ourselves that Powerpool’s core mission was to leverage the popular vote.
To alleviate these issues, we propose the following:
1.Diminish voting power of remaining vested testers, 10,000,000 CVP, to 50% to match current circulating supply — 5,000,000 CVP. This would allow for a better forum for the popular vote to potentially thrive in.
Boost voting power of active governance members
Boost voting based on holding period
Deduction of voting power if tokens are transferred out
1. If tokens are involuntarily vested then it won’t count towards boosting.
The motivation here is simple. Allow PowerPool to be the change that it wishes to see in other DeFi governance protocols. Testers are being compensated for their work through free CVP. There’s no need to compensate them indirectly through over-leveraged voting power. Let’s build a community where popular opinion wins. Let’s incentivize the active participants in forums and voting. The proposal put forward would give all participants who participate and hold more voting power. This is fair since their actions are those of long term holders. This proposal could also increase buying and limit selling. Nothing is lost since voting power is deduced when tokens are transferred out of the contract.
Reputation would be a dual, non-transferable, token model system which is preminted and claimed. This is similar to DxDao’s system which aims for holographic consensus. This would amplify users’ votes according to their participation and time held. For example, if you own 100 CVP then you own 100 REP with REP sliding.
For the initial distribution of REP the team will snapshot the governance proposals’ voters/participants from Vote #1 till 24/9/2020. This first REP distribution shouldn’t take into account time held in order to simplify it.