Thanks, yes, I dont have any questions to the team re the Power Index - I invested in CVP because I was sure that the team will add this product.
I tested it and I like it.
@YHRW is right about launch of other indexes, but I believe the team can find a sweet spot between a quick delivery and product quality
Re the procedure for community voting on index composition - yes, I will lay out my thoughts in more details in coming days (need to play with tokenomics model first)
Yeah, I am tracking and discussing in discord and here pretty actively:)
Proposal 7 is by @DeFi
(mine were proposals 2, 4 and 5:)
Our mistake. Btw your Proposal 5 also is covered in this article:)
I should say after reading that this prop I liked more than props 4&5 by @Sergey. Cuz
But, As @RyanW said, I’m also worried about inflation and huge sell pressure in the second year. The voting power of Beta/Gamma testers should also increase linearly with circ supply increase. We should escape imbalance.
Hey, actually prop 4,5 and prop 6 are not very much comparable
As proposal 4 was published 7+ days before the Delphi’s proposal (and we didn’t know at that moment that Delphi had been working on their proposal 6) the key goal of prop 4 was to summarize all the info on the tokens distribution schedule we had at that moment and to show the community that this is a bloody big issue.
After we discussed prop 4, we come up to idea that we will not reduce the testers reward and will only introduce new lock ups and vestings (which were more testers friendly btw:) and started to discuss what can be improved with proposal 4 (additional incentives etc)
Re the proposal 5 - its key goal was to just halt the distribution
Now prop 4 and 5 can look a bit useless, but they more than achieved their goals
Proposal 5 was a success, the goal was achieved 
I agree with you about Beta/Gamma voting vesting.
According to the latest statement (https://medium.com/powerpool/team-statement-latest-lm-and-cvp-token-distribution-proposals-ec83e006f8cf):
The current CVP supply on the market is 5,438,154 CVP, so we need to make Beta+Gamma less than that. We propose to limit overall Beta+Gamma cumulative voting power up to 5m of CVP instead of 10m (each wallet will have 25k votes instead of 50k), so current CVP holders will have the majority in this vote. The idea of limiting the voting power of Beta+Gamma up to 5m votes (in mainnet) was also proposed in Proposal 7.
So I think we will find a middle group fairly soon
I have played with Delphi’s model, and here are some additional thoughts (dont incl consideration on voting power):
Alphas have received their tokens and I understand, the team will not take measures to try to contact ~50% of alphas who hold (maybe already less) and negotiate a lock up with them - so this is given. (I personally don’t know the way of how it can be solved)
This distribution to alphas creates contradictions between early LPs and beta/gammas
2yr total vesting for the testers is a sweetspot between usual vesting for teams (2-4 yrs) and private round investors (1-2 yrs)
Early LPs should have an advantage in lock up / vesting terms. This is pretty straightforward - the more you risk and the more expensive you buy an asset the better liquidity terms you should have
Alternatively, we could consider distribution of the first 2 mn CVP from LM program to the early LPs retrospectively and lock /vest the early LPs LM rewards with the same timeline as Beta/Gamma
Unlock of beta/gammas and DAO grant should be tied to a simple KPI - the size of the pool (can model it separately if folks are interested)
So lets compare several scenarios with adjustments below
Dynamics of token distribution
Dynamics of shares in circ supply breaking down by group of stakeholders
Dynamics of token distribution
Dynamics of shares in circ supply breaking down by group of stakeholders
Dynamics of token distribution
Dynamics of shares in circ supply breaking down by group of stakeholders
I am FOR the third one, but want to make it a bit more aggressive
Happy to discuss and finalize.
Hey guys!
Why not just to make a 2 year linear vesting both for beta and gamma testers + add KPI for them?
So imagine the situation with proposed vesting (1 year lock and then 1 year vesting):
The tester was working well during the first 6 months of the project (discussed proposals, did marketing and etc) and then something went wrong with him and he stopped doing it at all. Team noticed it and told him: unfortunately your tester allocation would go to the community pool because you became inactive. But that’s kinda unfair besause the tester has been working for 6 months at the start.
So that’s why I would like to see 2 year linear vesting after mainnet launch with clear definition of testers KPI. Happy to discuss it futher.
I’m with you here. 2 year linear vesting seems fair to me. However, the idea is to make supply during the 1st year as tight as possible.
Please check out option #2 here Proposal 6: Vesting, Liquidity Mining & PowerIndex Design
This is 24m vesting for beta / gammas (if all KPIs have been achieved)
As early LP I would be OK with linear vesting for the testers (maybe 3-6m lock and then linear vesting), but there are two things here to consider:
Following LM rewards from Delphi’s 24mn CVP LM plan should be matched in lock up/vesting terms with beta/gammas
-> Only this approach will be fair for all the parties involved
(One more thing which could be done is to negotiate the vesting terms with Alphas which still hold CVP, but I am not sure how easy this would be for the team and how much is this realistic)
Conclusion
If we vest beta/gammas for 24m, we need to improve the terms for early LPs (who took more risk) in parallel. This will lead to boosted cir supply in year 1 and selling pressure
This is an aside, BUT, can we develop a proposal for testers who want to LP to receive some portion of their beta or gamma distribution of CVP sooner? I’d like to LP across several of the pools, not just the 10% CVP, 90% ETH pool, so if we could skew rewards to be higher for LPing vs beta testing, and apply a bonding curve or vesting schedule to the LP rewards, wouldn’t that also solve the problem of changing the distribution of CVP over time and encouraging lockups? Just thinking out loud here - seems like it would be a good mechanism to separate people who want to market sell vs people who want to accumulate voting power by LP’ing.
I think I’ve voiced this before but as a Gamma tester just reiterating I’d be fine with a vesting period of a year, particularly because LPs are subject to it as well.
Meltdem,
Thanks for participating in the forums. It’s refreshing to see a tester here.
Is this accurate to what you’re proposing?
Proposal
Don’t dilute tester allocations and impose a vesting schedule
Offer an alternative vesting schedule for testers that want to LP
Tester LP rewards have their own vesting schedule
Comments
I am against this proposal as that would double down on the influence of testers that have no skin in the game and would earn exponential funds off of the house’s money. I would be for this proposal in typical VC and private sale deals where there’s vesting + forced participation in the protocol through lending or staking. However, testers never spent money on allocations.
Agree with @DeFi
The fact that there was no capital at risk to receive the testers’ allocations is a pretty important factor that restricts the implementation of the model you describe.
Also, could you please advise how to tie a bond curve mechanics here? not sure I fully got it
Thanks
As I said in response to your prior proposal, I personally don’t have issues w changing the balance between testers v LPs, so long as it has community consensus to pass, that’s the whole ethos of Powerpool - distributed metagovernance. I’m saying that testers who want to LP should be able to do so, you’re saying testers shouldn’t get anything and only ppl who had capital to buy tokens should, so idk that’s pretty far apart in terms of philosophy. Predicating participation based on $ is sort of antithetical to the Powerpool experiment - I find it odd that you’re advocating for plutarchy (pay to play) in an experiment that attempt to change the dynamics of protocol politics by giving active participants and contributors a stake early on. Anyways, it really feels like a few people want to push things in a very specific direction so I guess this is the best test of the Powerpool governance mechanism. Unless the voting dynamics change, it’s really up to the Alpha testers and the VCs who market bought their tokens.
You can now go vote on this proposal at the link below. We made a few modifications based on feedback.
This. I think the other side of this proposal is voting that testers receive no tokens at all so prices head one way. Clearly anyone buying into the network knew the vesting terms. For them to acquire tokens retroactively and pull activism to push out people without hthem having a say in the network is going to be the bane of the project. I have personally stopped spending time because it did not feel like there is a middle ground. Other large influencers like DeFi Prime have also began pulling out. Clearly the trend is obvious here if this is how this community wants to run itself.
Also with all due respect to the folks at Delphi - what are you really optimising for here? You curate a group of 300 people who can vote and help meaningfully then say they cant vote for 12 months after breaching a social contract that clearly said the 10% of supply will be released at mainnet launch. This is some really dumb shit.
I am sorry i sound so frustrated but clearly some members here want to pass proposals without discussing or finding middlegrounds. I have spent sufficient time trying to talk sense on here…
Will see you at the voting grounds. Also please dont come at me with some “bUT br0 u Want dumpz” nonsense. I literally agreed to signing legal contracts and pushed for longer vesting the whole time but somehow the whole ethos is to block out all testers and frustrate them with the most pain in every way you can.
Why should testers make money on top of free money? You claim that not allowing this is antithetical to Powerpool’s “experiment”. This is false. PowerPool’s mission is to deliver power to small holders to match that of the VCs, the influencers, and the inner circles (pretty much you).
Every governance protocol has your definition of plutarchy. Why? Because those with skin in the game have vested interest and responsibility to ensure proper governance.
Honestly, if testers were given the option to choose between locking tokens or being an LP then 100% would choose to become an LP. Why? Because just holding locked tokens means you’re not achieving alpha. The result? 10,000,000 CVP or $30,000,000 LP-ing with free money to make more money and control more of the CVP in 200 wallets. How does that solve anything? If LP rewards are vested then that still doesn’t solve the skewed allocations and inevitable distribution. The distribution under your “proposal” will transfer a larger absolute percent relative to the circulating supply than the current proposal. When Delphi Digital’s proposal vesting period ends and testers receive their free tokens it will be a lot smaller relative to circulating supply then if it was released tomorrow. Your proposal makes it 10X larger. Which would probably destroy the project.
You continuously make it seem like a bad thing that people spent money on a startup they believe in. Is this psyops? Crypto Twitter Influencer gets free tokens and shames people who had to pay.
Do you read the Discord, blogs, team statements? The testers will be able to vote on Proposal 6.
Also- stop referring to PowerPool as an "experiment’. Does your attempt to deprecate the team and community’s work help you validate your false sense of entitlement?
I’m proud to say I was the winning vote in this historic moment
