I and many others have voiced the same sentiment here as ryan.
To summarize:
It seems no one is opposed to Part A. If this is a serperate proposal of itself, it should pass with full support.
Parts B & C - clearly have opposition and need extensively more community input and discussion before having something the majority aligns with.
my additional two cents are to question wether Parts B and C are even worth discussing? does this help powerpool achieve our goals?
I understand why is Part C is controversial.
But can you point out what’s wrong with B?
I’m honestly don’t understand, since it’s impossible to execute A without B on tech level.
I’m shocked to see myself on the red list. Pretty sure I had hung out here and voted in the past (or else I wouldn’t be posting here right now).
However I disagree with slashing people because of the lack of onchain participation. On-chain governance is only a small part of governance. So much governance and decision-making is done off chain. You can contribute hugely to a network without any onchain voting. I myself have been telling close friends about PowerPool.
Also, all testers have spent considerable amount of time helping with testing. If we do slash, we shouldn’t slash all of it.
Hey.
Feel free to reach out @powerpoolAdmin and show your contribution.
It’s not only onchaih, but offchain verified by team.
And answer this part:
It helps to build framework to help team communicate with testers.
Most testers are truly valuable power of PowerPool.
We
Don’t want to slash them without reason (and with current contract we can only make 100% slash. No playoffs)
Want to motivate testers to communicate with team.
Once again, team tried to reach out testers. Not once and not twice.
As proposal said:
As I know all wallets in “red” list are wallets that (1) never voted (2) never contributed anything off chain (3) didn’t contact the team and propose plans how they can help the project. Basically, people that are not interested and dissapeared.
Your understanding of this proposal is misleading.
Part A- cut distribution to freeloaders
Part B- A new vesting contract is needed to carry out Part A. It also subjects testers to the same subjectivity the currently proposed slashed testers face. It’s only fair to treat all testers equally. The proposal states that the community has the right to propose an additional slashing if necessary. It doesn’t give Management Board any exclusive rights.
Part C- States MB’s right to build a workflow with the team to extract value from testers
This entire analysis took two weeks of on chain and off chain data.
Wallets slashed never voted, never contributed off-chain, and never reached out or responded to the team.
Playing down concerns because they come from accounts that rarely post, or accounts that are new (“idle testers” as you call them) is illustrative of the small-windowed view that you have on the world. Of course we know the reality - you want to dismiss all opposition to the above sketchy proposal, irrespective of how well articulated and reasoned it is.
There are testers here who rarely post, myself included, that have done more for this protocol in 3 hours of off-screen time than you have contributed with all your days of inane on-screen posturing.
It’s preposterous to rank criticism in this way and absolutely at odds with the decentralised DAO-like system you supposedly aspire to implement.
If this was true then you, and others in the Red Zone, would not be slashed as there was extensive off-chain analysis done by the Core team. If you believe this is an error then you’re more than free to reach out to them or provide what you did here on the forum. Please let me remind you that this was a four week process with on-chain and off-chain analysis done.
I am absolutely not in the red zone. Nor are the testers commenting here.
It shows so much about your skewered minuscule worldview that you assume every tester here that is commenting is in the red zone. We just think the proposal is terrible. It damages the outcome for everyone.
Your defense was that testers contributed off-chain, but if that was true then testers wouldn’t be slashed as there was extensive research done by the Core team regarding this.
I’d second the sentiment here on this being two different proposals.
I am for slashing inactive testers who did not complete any tasks or participate in governance.
Strongly agreed that constantly moving the goal post sets a weird precedent for what can and can’t be anticipated for any vested tokens. Testers were selected for a reason, and all those who have met the expectations should be eligible for at least 50% of their promised allocation for having agreed to the vesting schedule and completing the requested tasks.
Tester allocations are seemingly being treated as a looming storm cloud rather than as a valuable asset to mobilize high value community members.
I would look to change the framing around “how do we penalize this actor for not complying” to “how do we activate this member”.
Overall, happy this is being discussed as it is an important subject, and one that should have strong community discussion.
@TylerDurden mate, why are you saying all these things in regards to the Part C?
This is just simply not true and a manipulation… with such aggressive wording! How come the MB is taking over the control of the vesting contracts? Do you really think the PP team is giving us the private keys or what?
Obviously MB is not controlling the code part or the project!
Once again, I believe it is all clear with Part A and Part B - these parts just describe how to slash the inactive guys (I) why them, and (ii) how exactly it can be done from technical standpoint.
@RyanW I wonder why are you saying “in theory” about Part A. Why is this theoretical? this is all about the practice, simple math, and the future of the protocol.
“In theory” these 40 guys should have contributed to receive the rewards, but the theory didn’t work out as we see.
And here we have real numbers - 2 mn of CVP will not be dumped. Is it enough to fix all the issues with tokenomics? I believe it is not.
BUT
This is definitely something we CAN do to fix the existing issues - e.g. we can put this 2 mn for TVL boost in the next couple of years, or to stimulate CVP staking/locking etc etc. Moreover this is just fair.
In combination with other measures, I believe this will work.
Now lets go to what I understand is the only real stopping factor - Part C
"Contract management and team capabilities:
Where is the MB taking over the Project?
Yes MB can suggest changes, but it is the PP team, the community and the multi-sig signers who decide! The governance is still decentralized.
With the Part C everything around the testers allocation will become more transparent and streamlined (still on anonymous basis)
Why exactly do you think it is awful?
Do you think the team / the community controlling the tokens distribution is bad?
I consider the Part C as one of the ENABLER for currently relatively inactive testers to contribute. This is exactly what are you talking about imo.
Yes, it would be much more sweet to have only positive motivation methods, but looks like it doesn’t work in practice - see thee general community reaction since August (community includes pretty sizeable LPs, like me)
And basically Part C is not a negative motivation imo. Who said the discipline and transparency are negative?
I personally would be happy in case Part C is accepted and all the testers from remaining 153 approach the PP team (or respond when the PP team approach them), keep making input and receive their 50k CVPs in full.
From what I see, communicating with some of the large investors the current situation around testers allocations (together with some other pretty critical issues which we will hopefully fix in coming weeks) is one of the factors hindering the PP development. Not the main factor, but an important one.
For the community this factor has eaten the most part of time and efforts unfortunately. And those efforts could be directed in full towards value creation instead.
Proposal 29 suggests how to finally solve it with relatively small blood and show the market that we tackling this complex issue in an open and responsible way
These tester’s tokens are gonna seriously damage CVP for everyone. In the best interest of this protocol I hope this proposal passes at least. I hope the “good” testers can provide evidence of their work and get rewarded. Whatever happens I don’t think even the best testers deserve a full 50,000 CVP though, that’s what the management board get paid for much more extensive, tangible work now.
when will power pool tweet that this proposal is active?
@powerpoolAdmin, MB and Powerpool community:
Reading the above, as a tester, I felt the need to respond to this. I’d like to pose a few questions to the team and perhaps share a different perspective with the community on why Powerpool is in this position:
1.) Of all your testers, how many meetings did you set up with each one?
2.) How many times have you contacted each tester over the live cycle of the project?
3.) What specific efforts were taken to present roles and responsibilities to testers and how often were those efforts taken?
4.) What were your KPIs to gauge tester participation and what strategies did you leverage to meet these KPIs?
5.) You have almost 200 beta/gamma testers, how many people do you have dedicated full time to managing those relationships and extracting value?
Let me answer these questions for the community from my experience as a tester:
1.) I’ve had two meetings with team members, with no follow ups, next steps or actionable items after each meeting.
2.) I have been contacted three times. First time to let me know I was accepted as a tester with the guide on how to test, second to let me know they had new products coming, and third to alert me of new snapshot proposals which included a threat to be slashed if testers didn’t participate in snapshot voting.
3.) I have no recollection of being communicated clear R&R and how I could help. If they did share with me, it was so long ago at this point with no follow ups that I don’t remember.
4.) Only team can answer this
5.) Only team can answer this
Perhaps my experience is an exception and perhaps the team has great answers to the above questions. I would happily stand corrected.
However, based on my experience the current situation is not the fault of the testers, but a serious issue with project management by the team that will not get any better unless it’s addressed. I am open to a different perspective depending on the experience of other testers, but this is an important point for the future of the project.
You picked testers that are active in this industry and could contribute value to the project. I would hope that 40 inactive testers would be considered a failure internally and you should be asking yourself why this happened - not pointing the blame to testers and trying to walk-back the deal that was originally offered.
A large aspect of this project was to create a bootstrapped and curated community of industry experts, influencers, researchers, etc.You started off right with large token allocations to people you believed would bring value to the project, but have not followed through post-launch (at least from my experience). You dove too deep into product, and never leveraged the human capital you paid so much for in the start.
In my opinion, it’s not too late to turn this around. But if Powerpool keeps the current sentiment that puts testers on the ropes at all times, constantly defending ourselves and doing whatever we’re told to get access to tokens, I don’t see you extracting much value from the CVP invested in testers. I hope that you can take this as constructive feedback and think more about how to get value out of the investment in testers.
Proposal 29 Part C amendment: Setting trial period for tester’s allocations changes.
After collecting an extensive feedback on Proposal 29 from a large group of active testers and while we agreed on Parts A and B of the proposal, we suggest to change the Part C to make it more precise and actionable
To ensure better goal-alignment between Testers, the Core Team, and the Management Board and the Community, all parties involved agree to limit the time changes in individual vesting of testers can be done to the first 4 months after vesting starts.
To do it, we propose to change Part C of Proposal 29 to:
“Set-up allocation management rules and limit Management Board actions to: changing vesting rules of individual testers, burning unvested token of individual testers.
All allocation change proposals have to be verified and executed by the PowerPool Core team. For every tester allocation, the mentioned actions can be made during the first 4 months after vesting starts."
We hope that this proposal is accepted by all parties. Over the weekend we worked with a small group of testers to craft the message. We feel as this is a more equitable approach. Thanks once again to everyone who contributed to push this out!
I have voted in https://snapshot.powerpool.finance/#/powerpool/proposal/QmSS4sdvcyUX9x46FysN3Me9GFb1dLR8TsdYMZFMkcqsiY
I downloaded the report (“Download Report” button) which shows all the addresses that have voted, and searched my address there. It’s there. @powerpoolAdmin please run all the addresses in the red list against the report to verify.
