Proposal 29: Amending the Allocation for Beta and Gamma Testers & Launching a New Vesting Contract

Proposals
1

Disclaimer: The Management Board has done extensive on-chain and off-chain analysis before putting forth this proposal to the community. The testers’ identities weren’t shared with the Management Board members but cross-checked by the Core team.

Summary

Part A:
Decrease Beta and Gamma testers CVP allocation by 20.7% and total CVP supply by 2%. This represents a total decrease of 2,000,000 CVP slashed from 40 idle testers. Other testers will still have their tokens based on their on-chain contribution and off-chain activity (see details below). Therefore, if this proposal is approved then the new Beta and Gamma allocation will become 7,600,000 CVP. This amount can be changed in the future based on Governance proposals.

Part B:
We propose to develop and launch a new vesting contract for tester’s allocation which will allow Management Board to manage allocations and distributions for individual testers.

Part C:

Set-up allocation management rules and limit Management Board actions to: changing vesting rules of individual testers, burning unvested token of individual testers.

All allocation change proposals have to be verified and executed by the PowerPool Core team.

If you’re a tester and want to know where you stand, and how you can help, please message @powerpoolAdmin!

Abstract

Powerpool had a controversial token distributed that allocated 15 million CVP, 15% of the total supply, to three tranches of testers (Alpha, Beta, Gamma). Each tranche was allocated 5 million CVP, 5% of the total supply, but with different unlock periods. Alpha testers’ allocation was unlocked on Powerpool’s launch. The distribution’s goal was to bring valuable players, with different skill sets, to help the protocol scale quickly. While many testers have provided immense value to the Powerpool ecosystem others have been idle on-chain and off-chain.

In Q4 2020 CVP Community voted in favor of implementing a 6 month lock on the Beta and Gamma allocations. Additionally, 350,000 CVP was forfeited to the Community treasury by 7 testers who didn’t complete testing tasks.

The time has now come to make another decisive decision for Powerpool’s future.

In accordance with the Management Board’s mission, to scale Powerpool in value, we are proposing the following.

Part A

The Management Board proposes to infinitely lock, or burn, 2,000,000 CVP from 40 idle Beta and Gamma testers. This represents 20.7% of the Beta and Gamma allocation and 2% of the total CVP supply. This was done by analyzing extensive off-chain and on-chain data. We then sorted Beta and Gamma testers into three groups based on their activity on-chain and off.

Part B

We propose to develop and launch a new vesting contract for tester’s allocation which will allow Management Board to manage allocations and distributions for individual testers. However, the current vesting contract will be frozen and token allocations will be migrated to the proposed vesting contract. It will take some time to develop and audit the new contract. Therefore, we’re proposing to delay the vesting start date until the new contract will be deployed. The current vesting begins April 1st, 2021.

Part C:
We propose the following rules for management of testers’ allocations.
For every tester allocation the following decisions can be made by Management Board:

  1. Vesting period for tokens and votes (voting vesting) can be prolonged for any tester allocation with no limits on number of such extensions or their duration
  2. The remaining tokens (amount that is vested) can be transferred to a zero address what is equal to burning them

Contract management and team capabilities:

  1. The contract will be managed by the team multi-sig
  2. Team will verify every proposal for vesting prolonging/slashing from Management Board based on their own data (including off-chain contribution) before executing such a decision.

Motivation

Provide the community with a fair and transparent distribution for testers’ allocation that reflects their commitment to building the Powerpool ecosystem. This will help create a more equitable ecosystem and align all stakeholders. Additionally, this will decrease the inflation schedule which will allow CVP to grow in value with the upcoming indices, business development, and product launches.

Specification

With on-chain activity analysis, Snapshot voting participation, and off-chain contributions we sorted Beta and Gamma testers into three groups. Off-chain contributions were confirmed by the Powerpool Core team. Off-chain contributions include: marketing, research, strategy, product design, and other valuable inputs for the project.

Groups:

  • Red: Testers to be slashed right now (no governance participation, no valuable off-chain contribution)
  • Yellow: These testers are on the watchlist because they have contributed somehow by off-chain activities, but barely participated in governance.
  • Green: Testers who showed both governance participation and off-chain contribution.

The red group includes 40 wallets, who voted only once/never or never made any substantial off-chain contribution. The Management board reserves the right to slash additional testers in the future or prolong vesting to selected wallets if necessary (see Part C of the proposal). The motivation here is to build an aligned and active community.

So, finally we propose to do the following

  • Slash 40 testers wallets (burn their vested CVP tokens)*
  • Delay vesting until external security audit for the new vesting contract is received
  • Deploy new audited vesting contract with changeable individual vesting schedules
  • Define new rules for managing testers’ allocations (Part C of the proposal)

*From the technical point of view the team will burn 9,600,000 CVP in the old contract by applying infinite vesting to all tokens (since it is the single opportunity to burn these tokens based on the code of the contract). All testers allocations that weren’t slashed (153) will have 50,000 CVP in the new vesting contract funded from team multi-sig. It means that 9,600,000 CVP will be burnt forever, and remaining 153 testers will still have their vested tokens.

Special thanks to @Zero for analyzing on-chain activity and PowerPool team for their consulting and off-chain data verification.

The Red Group (Wallets to be slashed):

0x009170c4a4b300b3b0606eEafE3fB25Ae3938FB5
0x1bBE9fE79D6d660EA108a2dA3d4E89E58477A8D6
0xAA7A9d80971E58641442774C373C94AaFee87d66
0x8C03A859BE9b4a5a2E54c1AB9C6b1dD79E8Aa3d9
0x279A8AEdCCA46f435B7aEC6c6240421042462EEC
0x2Da8273C586c9488096A0a7f117EfE95f9905eD7
0xC11f1010C6b75Cda68776528A94618579eF21C12
0x62A94a3bF2dFC247f5dc861387336Eb17A2E1141
0x738a9AA93974C7f82D97adfBe2BC80046b347B11
0x84740F97Aea62C5dC36756DFD9F749412534220E
0xa834e439A41f1F72AC2af9EDb8aD825D9830e2c0
0x170c5cADb50dc163db0DD786C96D7ecb5E24a379
0x8517D50Cdd95abA21B94968A98d526B743174497
0xedFbe70e9C10B23b955988df06488B8DFd543Ddd
0x3e1D23BE803C31D2c44EFe84fB96659D12C49fD5
0x331c12bBe5111763CFe5CDC6F93876B206AdF99B
0x0a1908B732884449b819e146F257fB6018d00Ab1
0xe921906A819Eaec8DF8d1EA395BeD1Add27605F6
0x4295F78bba333352965B5ed08DC5b4c6833bAF7d
0xf519C842210Abb71c6ED4Cc26d3aAbee9853befF
0x779e9717C7040ECa7CE5a4749cF960c0441Aa151
0x6C3E8b4Dc0cCaA9a3Ae535465b0893E3B029bb00
0xB4dC010733Ea4F3B42F71244C4B2357129d971C8
0xF9342660f2ba86270C6854c7f59773A20A8F5dEF
0x88FB3D509fC49B515BFEb04e23f53ba339563981
0x867db38C83F4287A71ffd0Cdfba6fFAE93150Ff7
0xdE7a82Fe90EaB3F5235552F2137402a69d53FB94
0x31de3aD9fbfAeb90348d5cb8a101FBB68f28cEfF
0x97116fC08e002e79736f641Efb164114942c0732
0xfb17199BB361dAED5B8dF4E0d263f2f6CB990C50
0x3b0e6b8E5f72df429E58C0885806F2dA874AA1De
0x424182a114B5bd42638791B6a6f11Fc1D6027e03
0x52e1e58DB9151d8A0f1dCd8Cb3b00948df114b8E
0xbE7aE9e43d4373BCe5b2d9195bbe31f6A7a0DB6f
0x7fB2eb7BCD35c48248789884AE803095fB3e9338
0x375Afe51C5d9313FF20504aa3094844400be3409
0x1fAbDC9da117d1392Aab80c69eC141e4D579341C
0x9fB753bE58cf3354Fc4684b0D59aba4edf1A90A9
0x58FA2617627a677Bd29d5ab11880D066111B8d0e
0x0282807BE542b828e840da354b32CC777444eC07

Proposal 29 Part C amendment: Setting trial period for tester’s allocations changes.

After collecting an extensive feedback on Proposal 29 from a large group of active testers and while we agreed on Parts A and B of the proposal, we suggest to change the Part C to make it more precise and actionable

To ensure better goal-alignment between Testers, the Core Team, and the Management Board and the Community, all parties involved agree to limit the time changes in individual vesting of testers can be done to the first 4 months after vesting starts.

To do it, we propose to change Part C of Proposal 29 to:

“Set-up allocation management rules and limit Management Board actions to: changing vesting rules of individual testers, burning unvested token of individual testers.

All allocation change proposals have to be verified and executed by the PowerPool Core team. For every tester allocation, the mentioned actions can be made during the first 4 months after vesting starts."

6 Likes
2

I’ve been following the discourse for the past few weeks now and I have to say, this seems to me a carefully considered approach that really threads the needle through a particularly challenging intermediate issue on our path to an ultimately an even better place with regard to CVP success and value.

Hats off to those who helped refine the approach. I’m looking forward to a swift approval!

1 Like
3

Curios to see some testers comment it, overall reads like a well-thought proposal, I can add only:

No freeriders, everybody has to contribute

2 Likes
4

This is a cool idea. Should get full vote support by its nature as well ;p

2 Likes
5

Perhaps the people in the red group will end up unaware of this vote.:joy:

3 Likes
6

No freeriders, everybody has to contribute

well summarized, nothing to add, FOR the proposal.

Glad to see 2 gamma testers out of the initial 4 comments agreeing with this @nagata @achapman.

The on-chain data speaks for itself.

1 Like
7

Nothing to add to this. REALIGN incentives and let’s take off :rocket:

8

Seems to have been a carefully considered proposal. Thanks for addressing this problem.

A few questions about it:
Can you provide a breakdown of how many people are in the green & yellow groups? How how much cvp is allocated to the green & yellow groups?

Are these going to be addressed in a future proposal?

9

Ok wait a minute.

There is far too much contained in one proposal here. Far too much.

You essentially have 2/3 proposals in 1 here:

  • Part A = slash 40 idle testers entirely
  • Part B = allow the team to do whatever they please with the rest (both in size and vesting) on a case by case basis
  • Part C = same as part B

My issues:

  • Slashing inactive wallets is fine, generally ok, but would be nice to make sure you reached out to the testers first.
  • Giving full control over token distribution is unacceptable and against the spirit of this entire project. This is not a direction you want to go down IMO.
  • Continually and sporadically changing targets of different vesting schedules doesn’t inspire support from large token holders/testers.
  • Your proposed rule changes do not take into account actions behind the scenes completed by testers. I know there are many such efforts by certain testers. One tester is not even on Telegram much, but is routinely out there speaking to funds and institutions trying to get them to buy into CVP (your continued efforts are appreciated sir if you are reading this!).

I think you should proceed with Part A only and seriously consider the rest of this proposal.

6 Likes
10

This proposal is unfair and goes against the ethos of crypto.

Part A (slashing idle testers) is understandable. However, parts B & C are not. Furthermore, bundling part A together with parts B & C comes across as a form of manipulation that increases the odds of community passing them all.

For the sake of fairness, parts A, B & C should be voted separately.

These are the reasons why Parts B & C are unfair and should be rejected:

  1. Rules should be equal for all testers. The “Management Board” should have no discretion in deciding individual allocations and distributions, as part B proposes, and part C expands on.

  2. Part C would allow the “Management Board” to extort testers, either explicitly (e.g. you tweet this or tweet that, you vote on this, you do that) or tacitly (e.g. if I don’t vote in line with what the “Management Board” wants, they will slash my tokens).

  3. Proposed rules would change the rules of engagement dramatically ~after the fact~, which goes against the ethos of crypto.

  4. Proposed rules fail to account for the many efforts done by testers in favor of PowerPool behind the scenes (many of us carry significant weight in the community and have brought in many CVP holders by recommending PowerPool both in public channels AND private channels, and conversations had in private channels can carry significant more weight, depending on the audience (e.g. whales, funds, etc).

PowerPool is supposed to be a decentralized meta-governance blockchain protocol, where decisions are made by the community, FAIRLY.

With all due respect to the massive and greatly appreciated efforts of the PowerPool team, the “Management Board” should not be given despotic powers over testers.

Approving parts B & C would corrupt Powerpool.

5 Likes
11

Hey @powerhouse thanks for taking the time to put this together. It’s clearly well-thought out. I understand your frustration and can see why you’d want to take a leap like this, but I’d encourage a different perspective.

Part A:

  • Generally slashing idle testers, as defined by not participating in on-chain governance, is a fair / logical decision. I would have expected the team to include this as a requirement from the start.

  • Off-chain activity being a factor, in my view, is against the ethos of blockchain and should not be considered. Powerpool is meant to be a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) governed by the rules of the protocol, not subjective off-chain behaviors. Additionally, I would have to assume that the decision making regarding who to include in the testing group was based on who would contribute on an off-chain basis. If the team made bad picks, that’s ultimately on them. It was part of the risk of the strategy.

Part B:

  • For this section I would again reiterate the ethos of the blockchain space and Powerpool as a project. If you want a centralized body governing who gets tokens and for what reasons, I would instead suggest you start a new project with these rules in place. I joined Powerpool as a tester because I believe in decentralized autonomous organizations and the power of decentralized governance with a curated bootstrapped community. In my opinion (and I hope the opinion of the broader community) passing this rule and handing over power to a subjective governing body is just not an acceptable direction.

Part C

  • My logic for part B applies here as well, I won’t waste everybody’s time regurgitating the same ideology in different words.

I’d like to point out that the decisions made to include heavy allocations to those testing the project and handpicking those testers out of a large pool of applicants was ultimately a social experiment. Personally, I still think this experiment has promise. If you are concerned with the token allocation of this project and how they decided to do so, I would actually encourage you to participate in a different experiment and move on to another project rather than trying to drastically change the ethos and ideology of this one.

I find Powerpool exciting because they were able to get people from all across the industry to care about this project and steer it in the right direction. A DAO, but with direction and a curated initial community, and I still think this has the power to be successful as-is.

At this point, it is up to the team to extract as much value from testers as possible. Rather than coming after testers and their allocations, I would encourage you (and the broader community) to instead ask yourself why the team hasn’t leveraged this hand-picked curated group of industry professionals in a better fashion. Perhaps the core team could do a better job setting up meetings, putting together marketing plans, communicating goals, organizing the community, etc. I believe I’ve only been contacted by the team 3 times maximum over the life of the project.

It’s really easy to come after testers and try to lower supply of CVP to increase value, but without a dedicated and successful core team leveraging their biggest asset (human capital), burning tokens won’t be enough to sustain the project.

2 Likes
12

It’s true that A and BC are quite different in nature, and I’m at a loss to vote.

13

Disagree this proposal, it’s so unfair. I mean I think the key to obtain the gamma round coz we made lots of contributions to powerpool. Me myself build a community take my time and energy, test the network, support almost 10% of CVP/ETH total LP liquidity. At that time the price dropped so fast and I lost my money coz the LP. I think gamma rewards is deserved. I think the most unfair part is alpha round. with no vesting. they can dump whatever they want. Everyone refer to my reply, please!!!

14

Well, from the beta and gamma testers, alpha has given them a bad image and puts all restrictions on them. However, I knew that it was too late to deprive the Alpha people of their rights, so I accepted in September that I couldn’t help with the 6-month lockup and 18-month distribution. I know it deprives 40 inactive testers who haven’t even voted. People on that list won’t even notice this suggestion. However, the remaining 153 people are those who accept the wrinkles from Alpha without complaint and contribute to their own activities. I promised that I wouldn’t change it in September. However, I had a feeling that this would happen. If we accept BC this time, some problems will be raised, discussed and reduced later. My feeling is that I would like the 153 people who have worked so far to be distributed for 18 months as promised.

15

@ak47, @Gamma_Tester, @nagata, @allen

  1. The ideal solution here is impossible very, unfortunately. We have tried to find a middle way as much as we can.
  2. Re B and C - this is to make the whole setup with the testers more transparent (still everything is anonymous obviously) and controllable by the community.
    E.g. to avoid a situation when a minority group out of 153 remaining testers does absolutely nothing for the next 18 months

P.S.
Yes. the situation with Alphas is unfair. very unfortunately we can do literally nothing with this, so have to remove this topic from the current discussion

16

It can’t be helped if it is finally decided by voting, but is it difficult to vote A and BC separately before that?

17

Hello there. Thanks for your response everyone.
Let me inject some details.

  1. Team tried reach out every tester through the year.
    As far as I know this 40 wallets never answered their messages.
    40 wallets in current proposal were inactive both: onchain (me and PowerPool team checked it several times) + offchain (team personally approved final list).

  2. In current vesting contract only one parameter is changable: vesting period. For all testers.
    So through DAO or not we can only infinity lock 100% of testers or don’t do anything.
    That’s why project needs new vesting contract which will be more flexible that current one.

  3. New contract without code and audit won’t work. So team clearly need time to do it. Around 14 days as proposed.

  4. Team is ultimately controlling slashing/vesting from multi sig -> hence ALL OFFCHAIN contributions are going to be taken into account.
    We don’t want cut heads, we want transparent and active community.

  5. A, B and C can’t be separated, cause today is April 1. Vesting started and pressure started.
    We need to do things quickly or it’s pointless.
    Setup framework through community not by ourselves - key priority, we obviously can’t do anything more than described before voting.

To sum up, we want make transparent field for everyone: both testers and not-testers.
But we need to do it quickly, because of special circumstances.

@nagata @ak47 @Gamma_Tester @allen @LordOfArda

18

with all due respect being an LP has nothing to do with this topic, I’m also a significant LP since the beginning, should I get 50K? maybe I can split your 50K half half with you?

everyone is aware of the alpha round, those tokens are fully released (nothing we can do about it), and everyone saw the outcome, the point of this proposal is exactly to prevent this.

sir, are you in the red group?

19

Please find below a modified proposal, which contains all that is needed to achieve your stated objective. It contains Part A, and a modified Part B. Part C can and should be separated.

Part A

The Management Board proposes to infinitely lock, or burn, 2,000,000 CVP from 40 idle Beta and Gamma testers.

Part B

We propose to develop and launch a new vesting contract for tester’s allocation which will allow Management Board to implement Part A. However, the current vesting contract will be frozen and token allocations will be migrated to the proposed vesting contract. It will take some time to develop and audit the new contract. Therefore, we’re proposing to delay the vesting start date until the new contract will be deployed. The current vesting begins April 1st, 2021.

20

We are living the most impressive bull market in the history of crypto. Mass adoption is real. Yet PowerPool has only managed to grow its number of holders by less than 10% in two months. The number of holders is now a mere 4460.

PowerPool would perform better if the Team or Management Board would use its testers to strategise how to grow the protocol and the number of holders, instead of antagonizing the testers.

It is much better to grow the pie, than to redistribute a small pie.

1 Like