Proposal 2: Decrease a minimal CVP balance required to create proposals


Decrease a minimal CVP balance required to create proposals from the current 10,000 CVP to 1,000 CVP level to enable up to 270 additional organic investors to create proposals.


  1. Provide access to governance activities to a larger group of organic CVP holders who put their funds at risk and cares of the future performance of Power Pool

  2. Engage this larger part of the community to
    a. actively participate in the decision-making process
    b. hold a fair amount of CVP


On Sep-10 the official communication introduced a barrier of 10,000 CVP to enable a proposal creation.

This barrier is too high and should be decreased to 1,000 CVPs now, while more sophisticated logic of what the barrier should be can be introduced in the later stages.

Why the 10,000 CVP barrier is high? Let’s see the breakdown of who can and who can not create proposals:

I. Eligible: 58 alpha/beta/gammas
– it is fair to assume that these holders on average less care about the project performance as they didn’t put their capital at risk

II. Eligible: 16 large organic investors

  • most likely whales, while I believe we want not only whales to be able to create proposals

III. Not eligible: 270+ supporters with 1,000-10,000 CVP

  • definitely includes a large number of alpha/beta/gamma who partially exited, but still adds the second large group of organic investors – “middle/upper-middle class”

Let’s dive deeply:

I. Small # of organic investors eligible to create proposals:
at the moment only ~16 organic investors have 10,000+ CVP on balance

Who are the current holders of 10,000+ CVP balances:
6 exchanges, 4 pools, 58 alpha/beta/gammas, only 16 ordinary investors (roughly)

-> While many of alpha/beta/gammas will definitely add a lot of value to the Project, this is definitely shouldn’t be the largest group eligible for proposal creation (see the reasoning above)

II. Just 16 organic investors are eligible, but they are most likely whales

Let’s assume that a rational investor would put a max of 10% of his portfolio into a risky project (CVP is obviously much riskier than Stablecoins, Curve pooling, ETH holding, DeFi large-caps holding)

Thus, 10,000 CVP @ $10 price its $100,000 worth of USDC

If this is 10% of the portfolio, then its total value is ~$1 mn and this is quite a conservative estimate imo.

-> No objections for having proposals from the whales from my side, but their # (16) is too small comparing to the total # of organic investors

III. ~270 addresses with significant (1,000 – 10,000) holdings of CVP are currently eliminated from proposal creation process

This 270 number includes other whales and alpha/beta/gammas, but it also includes “middle/upper-middle class”

->I believe this part of organic investors will be actively engaged in proposal creating process, which is very important at the Project’s start

Summing up:

  1. Decreasing the 10,000 barrier allows to spread the group of investors who can create votes
  2. 1,000 barrier is a very much ad-hoc approach…
  3. … But it allows to quickly plug in a large group of organic investors who cares of the Project future performance before the active proposal/voting period started

Further thoughts / next steps:

  1. On next stages we can think over a more sophisticated approach as I anticipate the questions like “why 1,000 CVP and not 5,000 or 500?” – this is a reasonable question, but lets bootstrap something more reasonable than 10,000 CVP barrier ASAP and then make the mechanism more complex
  2. We should definitely consider to count in staked CVPs, because the committed LP should be eligible to create proposals as they are definitely interested in future performance of Power Protocol
  3. Taking into account high CVP volatility, we can consider another solution – denominate the balance in USDC instead of CVP

I am definitely in favour of this proposal, it allows smaller holders to participate what to me is the one of the coolest features of Powerpool. Good job Sergey for writing it down. In addition the next step of counting staked CVPs makes a lot of sense to me as these are people that have high commitment to the project.

Hello there. Thank you for your prop.

I understand why you are proposing such thing, but don’t think it’s correct at the moment.

It’s kinda relevant if we assume that price will have less and less volatility.
But it’s hard to predict price action because in circulate supply we have only 5m of Alpha tokens + small batch of LPs tokens. It’s small amount, that can’t really represent correct price for CVP and prop-making barrier.

If price will dump for example, literally everybody that not so involved in PowerPool gov can do malicious props for their own sake.

So in my opinion we can’t really decide the relevant limit for making props. We need to wait at least till (and if) proposal 1 hop in production and see what LPs will do with their CVP.

I strongly agree, that 10k barrier is a big issue at the moment, but product is still not officially fully launched. We need more information.

For reference:

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It’s quite cool solution. Still think we need more CVP in circulate to judge, but it’s more interesting two-step verification than just decrease barrier.

I think the threshold of 1000cvp is a bit low, at least 3000cvp, the threshold of 1000cvp is too low.

I don’t think a fixed threshold is a good idea. Maybe we can design a computational formula associated with circulating supply.

yes, your arguments are good.
But we have to choose here between bad and worse.
What if the price stays in ~$10 corridor? only alphas will be able to make proposals?
Please, see the discord - it is a great point of concern that the alphas are absolutely untransparent.

So at least we could denominate the CVP positions in USDC - let it be $10 000 USDC + mandatory position as LP - this will be a waaay better than giving all the control to aplhas and whales at the start

Thanks COMP is undoubtly great project,
But do you think COMP is a good example for corp governance?
Especially for minoritiy stakeholders?

Sure we need more CVP to be able to judge better. But we dont have it.

I think that at the best move for CVP as of now will be to improve the token distribution (see Proposal 1) and give power to a larger part of the community ASAP.

This way we will save the project!

I would say it is not perfect, but just didnt want to enter the discussion like “1000 or 2,500 or 4,000”
This is manual control at the moment. We will make it more smart at next stages for sure.

Absolutely. Please see the “Further steps” section in the Proposal (in th end)

Fixed threshold - just to save time and implement it quickly.
After that we will provide more sophisticated solution (e.g. I would insist that to be able to propose a person should not only have CVPs but also be a LP)

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COMP’s solution offers a scalable method for what small wallets will do on Twitter or in community forums to garner support for their ideas. This just streamlines it.

I agree with this. We need to discuss the barriers, but the time feel more appropriate once the network is more mature. What about at the end of the beta wallet vesting?

I would also propose to postpone it till the network is more mature, but the project will not become more mature in case only alphas and whales can propose the govt decisions.

Another option is soone just purchase 10,000 CVP spending his/her 30%+ capital on it, but I wouldnt really consider strategic proposals from such risky persons tbh

After further consideration I do agree with you. This mechanism is a bit too complex for where we currently are in the product/governance/community cycle. I would be okay with a 5,000 DEV limit which will distribute more liberties to those who weren’t chosen in testing rounds, but bought on the market and have a large stake in the project.

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