To help address issues with Proposal 15, I believe we should strive to make a smart contract implemented difficulty increase to get a proposal approved. At the moment, CVP proposals are going through faster than we have time to discuss them. One option is to increase proposal voting period time, but I do believe we should keep flexibility to move fast if there is strong alignment with proposals. I believe the only way to do so is keep the voting period time, but increase the required CVP. We can also delegate votes to people if we have strong conviction for a proposal to submit a new proposal, so this would allow for a bit more flexibility, while increasing the security of the system.
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I strongly disagree with this change. Even 10000 CVP is a threshold high enough to exclude some active members of the community with lower stake to submit proposals on their own names but 100k is waaay beyond what is appropriate.
Maybe we can think about increasing it to 15k or 20k but 100k is simply not acceptable IMO, especially when there are other mechanisms to search for better consensus in the community, maybe increasing the quorum for the proposal to be valid from 400k to some higher number?
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As @Glow mentions, 100k CVP feels quite high. But there are quite a lot of CVP holders with very high CVP holdings, so it would only take e.g 2 * 50k CVP holders to fund a proposal they want. Etherscan says around 40 address that hold more than 40,000 CVP. But yea seems quite high.
Also as @Glow mentions, quorum could be increased. I think the project started with 400k quorum and there were ~<40 voters on average in the early proposals. Some proposals in recent times have over 100 voters. While other recent proposals have ~40 voters. So maybe increasing quorum is a good idea because in general more participation is occurring. But im not sure.
Also increasing quorum might comprimise the recent new participants if they dont have enough cvp in their wallets. 
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I just wanted to give a nor here nor there answer sorry
15K is fine as well. I’m not completely sold on 100K being a out of the question considering one can delegate their CVP. The idea is to force people to get enough quorum politically via forums, tweets, etc to get a proposal in, instead of posting a half-baked forum post and making a vote, just to end up with it passing and not enough people talking about it. The goal here is getting people to talk about it before a proposal is even sent.
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I think we are getting a head of ourselves.
IMO the numbers (100K-1K) is the least important ATM.
we need to have an understanding what is the a good process for submitting proposals, i think after we’ll have a better understanding it will be a lot easier find the right number.
Heres way for example:
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That’s nice but you have to assume malice and irrationality though. If someone is just blatantly calling votes to increase their reward rate so they can dump it, it will force CVP holders to constantly have to vote to stop the griefing. It is not good to have a low CVP requirement. I would rather have a high CVP limit, then call for protocol politicians and have people delegate votes using their CVP. There’s no benefit to a low CVP requirement in my honest opinion. It just increases the ease of griefers to take advantage of the governance.
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“you have to assume malice and irrationality though” we don’t need to assume, we saw it infront of our eyes the irrationality part, that is:).
I thought about and changed my mind.
i think you raized a valid point especially if you add protocol politicians into the mix, it should encourage people to seek a consensus before (and more engaghmnt beetwen community members).
I think that another way of doing so might a higher thershold 130K withot stacking and a much lower with astaking period.
Seems like we are all in agreement that governance voting structure needs at least some tweaking. In general, it seems like raising the CVP requirement would further support the protocol politician component of the ecosystem that I find as a very appealing source of differentiation from other index protocol competitors. Our DAO has such a wide scope of proposals we can submit with a dedicated development team backing us. This power should come with equally great responsibility.
We could be only limiting governance proposals to new index offerings and addition/dropping/replacement of a token in an index.
Then alongside this, regularly scheduled votes on logistical matters like liquidity mining rewards and token index weightings (or forking the 1inch governance dashboard of real time parameter changes).
Just stream of consciousness at this point, but is there any defi protocol that allows for staking of the proposers governance tokens that would be subject to slashing? e.g. there could be a third option along with the normal Approve/Reject options. Namely "bad proposal/doesn’t meet proper proposal requirements) that penalizes people for introducing subpar proposals.
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I agree.
Its an idea i’ve been playing with also.
Its basically implinating a POS solution for govenance, only caveat is it may have consocoinses we don’t fully understand ATM.
So to me, if we’ll choose to presue this path, it will be more prodent (& smart IMO) to start implement it in a smaller scale (bascally its doing a pilot).
For example implement a model only on liquidity mining proposales where’s the greed factore is more apparent (as we all Witnessed) & doing so might be a good way to offset it.
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I have over 100K CVP so your point of “address issues with Proposal 15” doesnt make sense…anyone can make typos. And it wasnt a bad proposal as Version 2 passed with flying colors…
@Sergey mentioned on the discord he is creating a proposal for organizational principles. Before we finalize a proposal here for voting submission, i think we should wait for his proposal as I feel it will consider future proposal creation, and who can create them, voting in them etc.
very important discussion, guys.
But too many moving parts.
I think this should be done not via an increase of the barrier, but instead via improving the procedure.
Imagine someone with 100k CVP.
This is either a pretty big whale (Lets say he/she put 10% of crypto into a very young and risky CVP.
Which means this person has $3 mn+ in crypto portfolio)
Or someone investing 50%+ of the portfolio into a very young and risky CVP (either fanatic believer or just poor risk management)
I am not sure whether I 'd be keen to see that only these kind of people can launch the proposal:)
Disclaimer: always can be inceptions. I am just describing an average situation, don’t want to hurt Alan, seriously.
Regrading the improvement of the procedure - need to continue working on ideation. The ideas I have considered so far had serious drawbacks
@Defly yes, I mentioned this and unfortunately it will take a fair amount of time to finalize.
I believe we need to set up the proposal launching procedure in parallel
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Thank you for this analysis! From my point of view, 100k CVP for a proposal is too much.
Personally I feel like it can be increased, but 100k sounds like too much. I’d vote for 25-50k range
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Since it’s hard to pin point to what is “optimal” level of CVP holding to create a proposal, we could perhaps gradually increase the CVP requirement overtime if needed? This flexibility may be good
I am in favor of keeping the bar low and as we build the community, we should use delegation function more.
I’m OK for having a longer voting period, but I don’t understand why you’d want to increase the min requirement for creating a proposal. We don’t want to leave this power for whales only, or future elected politicians with delegated votes. This needs to be an open process, 10K is plenty enough.
What we need is a solid guideline for proposals. Like @Defly has mentioned and as all should know @Sergey is working on something like that. Let’s wait
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