An opportunity to experiment in Governance mining

:Chris Burniske and Hasu’s tweets drew my attntion today and I started thinking about it

As you can see in the replays there were a lot of negative replays and rightfully so I might add

Because as far as I know this kind of voting system had never been tried before which makes it very risky to start experimenting it at scale. One can argue we have a similar large experiment in China right now but, if you can trust the data it has no value (I think we all know that states & politicians are manipulating data for the “greater good”’ The FED PCE is a good example).

My thoughts were that doing something like this on a protocol scale might be destructive!

but what if we could experiment on a smaller scale?.

wouldn’t it drive attention from the space leaders?

IMHO we already see gouvernance experimentation as a trial and error process in a lot of the DEFI space and it’s only the start. it’s an opportunity for this project as the space leading governance protocol to lead the way right from the start.

i mean if i am part of maker dao’s team i’ll be the first coming through that door!!!

This kind of experimenting can be branded as Govenuns mining! (a blink towards NXM Shilled mining).

It will most definitely make the community more engaged because in essence it’s more like community bootstrapping.

Another potential upside for this is: driving the value proposition of this project much higher but only if in the end of this process we can get incentivised gouvernance right. I’ll explain my way of thought: if the outcome of this experiment will be a balanced gouvernance system based on checks and balances via incentives the value of CVP will blow up because now everybody wants to participate in governance some in direct manner, others Via delegation because this model will be forked to other protocols…

It will most definitely reinforce a moat around this project.

So, what it basically means is you get rewards for participating in governance and punished for being indifferent.

The incentive to participate in governance mining can be reduced vesting period for Beta’s, Gamma’s, LP’s and governance stakers (for the record I am an LP and I’ll be the first to participate).

everybody will be able to allocate some, none , or all of their voting power for gouvernance mining.

i didn’t go through any numbers at the moment because i don’t know what your reactions will be so the numbers written below is only for the sake of showing how i think about it:

1.Only a portion of the vested supply - We can decide this soft cap of this experiment will be up to 20% - 30% of the vested supply when mainnet is up and running (in order to mitigate risks). If we want to expand it later, we will be able to vote on expansion.

2.Participance is an option - All possible participants will be able to choose if and how much they want to stake.

  1. Some of the cvp supply will be allocated from the 40,000 CVP locked for future allocation TBD and some will be allocated between the Gouvernance mining program participants. The contract will transfer funds from the punished wallets to the ones that need to be reworded.

  2. There will be a threshold in which participants won’t be punished. For example: you’ll be punished only if you voted on less than 60% of total proposals (this threshold will need to go up as time passes…)

it will take some irritation but only if it something worth exploring. to me it is but first and foremost it depends on the replays here.

i’ll end with saying we need innovation to build a Moat around this project and it might be a part of it.

Look at it like that: voting systems are thousands of years old, we might just stumbled on something that can be destructive…

Fill free to draw hols or build layers on my idea would love to hear your thoughts



In my opinion, offering monetary incentive for voting is worth discussing. However, more suitable solution to me is something more towards mentioned on the forum reputation system. I feel active voter should have more voting power, but without monetary incentives.

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Hey, this is in my interest to get incentives for voting, coz I am voting and will vote on all the proposals, but I don’t think this is beneficial to increase the circ supply for the people to vote.
It is better to decrease supply if the people don’t vote imo

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Great, that Placeholder guys put this for discussion now.

We started this discussion here last week and I actually was FOR dilution of those who don’t vote

After reading the negative replies to Chris twitt, I am even more convinced that we should dilute those who don’t want.
Most of the replies he received are from the guys who are not professionals in corporate governance. and they are giving these analogies just from the top of mind, not because they are fully understand what they are talking about imo.

Well, cool, mate, you are saying that “in classic corporates this work in another way”, but does this mean that you suppose the current corp governance is perfect? Lol

I believe that in Power Pool among the other things we are solving one of the key issues of the current corp governance practices - the minority shareholders apathy.
And since it exists in the classic world, than maybe something wrong with the classic world and we should try out something different?

Again, I am FOR dilution of those who don’t vote or delegate


Great, so I like the idea.
And the idea of decreasing the vesting period.

Happy to help with further ideation. need to think over, lets stay in touch:)

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It’s cool idea. Thank you @YHRW for post and @DeFi for prop 7.

I agree with @Sergey that before mainnet launch it’s quite bad to increase circulate supply.

On the other hand, i disagree with decreasing mechanich. Firstly because in my opinion it’s hard to implement and easy to fuck up.

Maybe punishment method can work out with testers and their locked tokens for certain time. Like a couple months or so. “participate in governance or die” strategy.
But it might lead to voting for voting. Not about quality of props.

And i definitely disagree that it should relate to other voting parties like LPs.

And atm I don’t read prop 7 closely, but idea of reputation - brilliant. Love it.

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Sorry for the delayed response (i have a lot on my plate right know as i explained on Discord) but as a result i had more time to think about this subject.

We need to keep exploring in order to find a balanced incentive structure for governance.
We are incentiving people to vote without understanding what might be the secondary affects of of those incentives as @Zero mentioned it earlier this might cuz “a proposal highper inflation”.
I’ll use a real world example:
In the country i live in we have a democratic parliamentary system.
We have 120 seats in the parlament.
For those 120 representatives to be re-alcted again they need to win inner party elections.
The governance system here is not favours stability (for a few different reasons) so we have a new government every 2 years.
The out come of this is, politicians here are always campaigning so the parlament here has one of the highest law proposals in the world.
They are allways trying to least new proposals.
It makes the parlament & the parliamentary work here very inefficient becuse most of the work been done is about “digesting” and than voting on proposals.
The house representatives are acting like this because for them to be re- elacted they need media coverage. And in order to get media coverage they are generating proposals.
My point being IMO the insetives structure you offer is only about activity and their is nothing to balance it.
I think that what we are missing (for the lack of a better word) is a “voting activity threshold”.
Which means if a player voting activity is above the threshold he or she voting power can’t be diluted…
This threshold can be used as a liver to offset hyperactivity.

Its a fair point about automated decreasing mechanism but isn’t more of a reason to test it on a small scale?
I’ll post

About your point about voting parties my reply is finding a use case for vested capital will add value to the project. Its will be the only project in the space (that i know of) that found how to use case for it’s vested capital.

Totally agree about your point about voting on voting for more voting :slight_smile:
Please see my reply to see my reply to @Sergey about adding a liver so the ability to offset this kind of outcomes will be at our disposal.

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Well, this sounds reasonable.
But in this context I dont see an issue if people vote actively.
In case we have reasonable/useful proposals active voting is good.

The issue is that people can create proposals just to show off - I believe this is exactly what your example is about. Like artificially inflated “creativity” in creation of new proposals.

As I see, the common practice to solve this is to

  1. set a high treshold for a proposal to be launched. but this creates a number of drawbacks as well
  2. set up a mandatory template structure for the proposal

To conclude, I dont see why the things I am suggesting will create the issue you describe

To put it simple:

  1. my goal is to make the people vote actively once per week
  2. and not to punish them for not voting on 5 redundant proposals per day
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We can use YFI example here. Before creating an actual proposal, they create topics with a poll to measure sentiment. It could be a good, measurable indicator of a proposal quality.


yes this is pretty simple and effective solution imo.

Big plus for this.

Good idea.

It crossed my mind that maybe i am missing a few things that you are aware of. If that so (which it probably is), i’ll try to communicate my worries in questions in order to understand if those worries caused by a potential risk or caused by a misunderstanding of how the voting system works.

For the sake of my argument lets assume two things:

  1. Your proposal no. 7 was approved.
  2. Governance will be migrated to a layer 2 protocol (Matic or XDAI) in order to reduce voting cost.

Isn’t it makes the government system more fragile?
You can basically spam it with proposals, in it?

Now, when we built a governance incentives structure that only incentives activity (Voting + proposals) even to the extreme (the more extreme the activity the more potential profits to be made) the secondary affect of what we are doing is basically, unintentionally, incentiving attacks.
Would you agree?

If there is no posh backs to my conclusion, its a potential problem we need to solve.

I’ll need to do some thinking about it, speaking for the top of my head a better solution to adding a threshold might be rewarding or penalising token holders only for voting on proposals that was approved (it doesn’t matter what they voted).
This incentive structure is more pron to efficient activity but again this me thinking out loud with you guys.

Need to think about some more…
Would love to hear your thoughts guys.

yeah, I felt the same way. If the cost (Time, Money, Reputation) of submitting a “spam” proposal is too low, we can see people abusing it.

So Reputation system can include part about people who create proposal, and rating can go all the way down to disincentivize malicious behavior. On top of that, things like locking some amount of CVP could be a solution.

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